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Abstract
In this paper we show how political uncertainty may impede economic growth by reducing
public investment in the formation of human capital, and how this negative effect of political
uncertainty can be offset by a government contract. We present a model of growth with
accumulation of human capital and government investment in education. We show that in a
country with an unstable political system the government is reluctant to invest in human
capital. Low government spending on education negatively affects productivity and slows
growth. Furthermore, a politically unstable economy may be trapped in a stagnant
equilibrium. We also demonstrate the role of a government retirement contract. Public
investment in education and economic growth are higher when the future retirement
compensation of the government depends on the future national income, in comparison with
investment under zero or fixed retirement compensation.
The authors are grateful to Gareth D. Myles and the anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are
ours.
Citation: Hashimzade, Nigar and George Davis, (2006) "Human capital and growth under political uncertainty." Economics
Bulletin, Vol. 15, No. 1 pp. 1−7
Submitted: September 14, 2005.  Accepted: January 28, 2006.
URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2006/volume15/EB−05O40013A.pdf1 Introduction
There is a considerable literature highlighting the role of human capital in the process of
economic growth. The literature also highlights the deleterious e⁄ect of political instability
on growth. In this paper we integrate these two ideas. We argue that an increase in political
instability leads governments to invest less in infrastructure that supports human capital
accumulation and thereby lowers economic growth. We also investigate public retirement
compensation schemes that may alleviate the growth-reducing e⁄ect of instability.
The idea of using human capital accumulation to sustain growth goes back to the early
1960s (e.g. Schultz (1961)) and was developed by Lucas (1988), Stokey (1991), and oth-
ers. One strand of these models features positive externalities to human capital or ideas,
leading to too little growth in the absence of government intervention. Such externalities
call for governmental actions, such as taxation, maintenance of law and order, provision of
infrastructure services, protection of intellectual property rights, and regulation of interna-
tional trade, ￿nancial markets, and other aspects of the economy. The government therefore
has great potential for good or ill through its in￿ uence on the long-term rate of growth1.
Recently, economists have begun to study the in￿ uence of government spending on
consumption-savings decisions in models allowing the possibility of persistent growth. These
studies have signi￿cant policy implications since government expenditures in dynamic general
equilibrium models may in￿ uence long-run growth rates and welfare. In a meta-analysis of
the empirical literature on the e⁄ect of ￿scal policies on growth by Nijkamp and Poot (2004)
government investment in education was found to be a signi￿cant factor in most of the stud-
ies. A negative relationship between growth and government instability has been found in
many empirical studies (see a survey by Brunetti (1997)). Political instability may a⁄ect
the economic growth of a country through various channels. The basic idea is that when the
probability of losing o¢ ce is high, the government has little incentive to commit itself to an
activity with a long-run outcome and, hence, chooses policies that are not Pareto-e¢ cient.
For example, Hopenhayn and Muniagurria (1996) ￿nd that the lack of persistence in policies
(government subsidies to investment) per se need not be welfare reducing but that it is likely
to decrease growth. Darby et al. (2004), using a political economy model in an endogenous
growth context, demonstrate that the existence of political uncertainty regarding re-election
tends to reduce the amount of public investment by incumbent governments and underlies a
switch from government investment to government consumption, thereby reducing growth.
The authors ￿nd empirical support for this hypothesis using panel data for OECD. As shown
by Gersbach (2004), ine¢ cient decision making by short-term politicians can be alleviated
by o⁄ering incentive contracts to politicians which become e⁄ective upon re-election.
In this paper we follow the approach of Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) in which the hu-
man capital component of the labour input in production is a⁄ected by public spending on
1A recent survey by Temple (1999) of the empirical literature on growth and its factors suggests that the
accumulation of human capital is not a su¢ cient condition for growth: ￿...a key challenge is to elicit the
conditions in which expanding education is most bene￿cial￿(Temple (1999), p.140)
1education.2 We show how political uncertainty may impede economic growth by reducing
public investment in the formation of human capital, and how this negative e⁄ect of political
uncertainty can be o⁄set by a government contract. Public investment in education and eco-
nomic growth is higher when the future retirement compensation of the government depends
on future national income, in comparison with investment under zero or ￿xed retirement
compensation.
2 Model
Consider a Lucas-Uzawa type economy, in which the growth of per capita income is driven
by accumulation of human capital. Production is linear in its single input, human capital.
The output is taxed at rate ￿. Net of tax output is consumed by private consumers. A
fraction ! of tax revenues is invested in human capital (education), and the rest is consumed
by the government. The population is constant and normalized to one. In every period
one available unit of time is allocated between education (e) and production (1 ￿ e). There
are two governments that randomly alternate in o¢ ce. In every time period the incum-
bent government faces an exogenous probability ￿ of being voted out and replaced by its
competitor. For simplicity we assume that the two governments are identical, and ￿ is the
same for both governments and constant over time. At the beginning of time period t the
incumbent government chooses !t to maximize the welfare function. The welfare function of
the current government is the discounted stream of weighted sums of the utilities of private
consumption and government consumption. When not in power the ex-government derives
utility from retirement compensation. We will consider di⁄erent cases for this ￿retirement￿
welfare and discuss the implications.
Here we will focus on the e⁄ect of political uncertainty on the investment decision, as-
suming that the tax rate and time allocation are ￿xed exogenously (the model easily extends
to endogenous choice of ￿ and e, without a⁄ecting the main results). At the beginning of pe-
riod t the only state variable is the current aggregate level of human capital in the economy,
Ht. The level of human capital in the next period, Ht+1, is a function of Ht and government
spending on education, Et. There is no depreciation, so the law of motion of human capital
is, therefore,
Ht+1 = Ht + h(Et;Ht) (1)
Similar to Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) we assume the following form for the production






2Blankenau and Simpson (2004) show, in the framework of an overlapping-generations model of growth,
that the response of growth to public education expenditures may be nonmonotonic, depending on the level
of government spending, the tax structure and the parameters of production technologies.
2with 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. The production function for the consumption good is
Yt = A(1 ￿ e)Ht (3)
Here, ￿ and A are the productivities in the education and production sectors, respectively.
The Bellman equation for the value function Vt of the government in power at the begin-





t ) + (1 ￿ ￿)U(C
p
t ) + ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)Vt+1 + ￿Wt+1]g (4)
Here, ￿ is the relative weight the government puts on its own consumption (a measure of
the government￿ s ￿sel￿shness￿ ), ￿ is the time discount factor, U(C
g
t ) and U(C
p
t ) are utilities
derived by the government from its own consumption and private consumption, respectively,
and W is.the value function of the ex-government. The equation for the latter is:
Wt = U(Rt) + ￿ [￿Vt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Wt+1]:
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k [U(Rt+1+k) + ￿￿Vt+2+k]
#
g: (5)
Two cases will be considered: (1) the retirement income is zero or constant and (2) the
retirement income is a ￿xed positive share of the national income in each period in the
future, Rt = ￿Yt, ￿ > 0.
The optimal investment maximizes the welfare function subject to the resource and tech-
nology constraints. Using the dynamic programming approach we solve (5) subject to (1)￿
(3), where C
g
t = (1 ￿ !t)￿Yt, C
p
t + Rt = (1 ￿ ￿)Yt, and Et = !t￿Yt. With a concave
utility function and linear constraints, the objective function is concave, and the ￿rst-order





























3Since the governments are identical, they make the same choice, and so the economy con-
verges to a balanced growth path, along which !t = ! is constant, and per capita income
and consumption grow at a constant rate, equal to the rate of growth of human capital,
g = ￿e[!￿A(1 ￿ e)])
1￿￿: (7)
We will focus on the balanced growth path solution. Along the balanced growth path













is obtained by di⁄erentiating Vt in the Bellman equation (5) with respect
to Ht and iterating i periods forward.
2.1 Zero or ￿xed retirement compensation.
If the retirement payment is zero or a constant ,
dRt
d!
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F (￿;￿) = 1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
2 (1 + g)
1￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)
1￿￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)
1￿￿￿2: (10)
4assuming ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + g)
1￿￿ < 1 and Rt=C
p
t ￿ 1. Equations (9)-(10) can be further
simpli￿ed for logarithmic utility (￿ = 1) and a production function of human capital that is







where ￿ = ￿(1 ￿ e)￿Ae and
F (￿) ￿ F (￿;1) = 1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
2 2 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
[1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
2: (11)




F (￿)￿=￿ ￿ ￿
￿1
F (￿)￿=￿ + 1
￿
: (12)
In Fig. 1 !0 is plotted as a function of ￿ for ￿ = 1=2, ￿ = 1=3, and ￿ = 2:0;2:2;2:4.3 The
optimal government spending in education, and, therefore, the growth rate in the economy
is lower, the higher is the degree of political uncertainty ￿, the lower are the productivities ￿
and A in human capital and consumption good sectors, and the higher is the government￿ s
￿sel￿shness￿￿. Furthermore, if the degree of political uncertainty exceeds a threshold ￿0 de-
termined by F (￿0) = ￿=(￿￿), government investment in education is zero, and the economy
falls into stagnation (g = 0). This threshold is lower (no growth even in a relatively stable
political environment), the higher is the degree of the government￿ s ￿sel￿shness￿(￿), the
lower weight it puts on future welfare (￿), and the lower is the level of technology in either
sector (A and ￿). When production function of human capital has diminishing returns
to investment (￿ between 0 and 1), for every level of investment the growth rate is lower
compared to the linear case. The optimal investment is then lower, the more the government
discounts future income, so that the negative e⁄ect of political uncertainty remains.
2.2 Government contract.
As we have seen above, political uncertainty and the possibility of losing power in the future
induces the government to consume more and invest less in the present, which can slow down
economic growth. One way to reduce this barrier to growth is to enter a contract with the
government, under which the compensation to an ex-government is tied to future national
income.4 Assuming Rt = ￿Yt, upon substitution and some manipulations, the Euler equation
3Assuming 5-year time between elections, these parameter values correspond to annual discount factor of
about 0.8 and annual growth rate of about 2 to 4 per cent.
4This is to some extent similar to the theory of executive compensation. E.g., McConaughy and Mishra
(1997) show that managers of the ￿rms with abundant growth opportunities tend to underinvest in available
growth opportunities; this e⁄ect can be o⁄set by increased long-term pay-performance sensitivity.
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0 > !0 for any ￿, since F ￿(￿) > F(￿). When the retirement compensation is
proportional to future national income, for any given level of political uncertainty government
investment in education is higher. The same holds for the threshold probability (if the
threshold occurs). In fact, the sign of @!￿
0=@￿ may even reverse as ￿ increases. This is
shown in Fig. 2. Note that for log utility the optimal investment and threshold probability
do not depend on ￿; this is not the case for ￿ 6= 1. This is the result of the interaction of
6substitution and income e⁄ects. For ￿ > 1 the substitution e⁄ect dominates: if the present
government contracts to get a higher share of national income when out of o¢ ce in the
future, it will tend to increase future output by investing more in the present. Similarly, for
￿ < 1 the income e⁄ect dominates, and the situation is reversed. For log utility, ￿ = 1, the
two e⁄ects cancel each other.
3 Concluding remarks
In this paper we considered a model of endogenous growth driven by accumulation of human
capital in an economy under political uncertainty. We showed that the deteriorating e⁄ect
of the political uncertainty on the government￿ s decision on investment in public education
can be mitigated by the government retirement contract. We are to date unaware of such
institutional arrangements: as a rule, the government retirement compensation is ￿xed.
For example, the severance payment for the member of the UK Cabinet of Ministers is
determined as three months ￿nal salary. As noted by Gersbach and Kleinschmidt (2004),
incentive contracts for politicians are not in use in modern democracies.
As an alternative (or in addition) to the government contract, one could model the
probability of losing o¢ ce as a (decreasing) function of the private consumption in the
previous period. Under this assumption higher investment in education, and, hence, higher
income and private consumption improves the chances of staying in o¢ ce. The trade-o⁄here
is, again, between present and future government consumption. The solution is complicated,
however, by the problem of time-inconsistency of the government investment decision.
There is also a possibility of private investment in education. However, as long as invest-
ment in education has positive externalities, it will be undersupplied, and public investment
will still play an important role. Furthermore, private decision on investment in education
can be deteriorated by redistributive taxation (Boadway et al. (1996)). Inclusion of pri-
vate investment in the model is not likely to a⁄ect the main conclusion regarding public
investment, as political instability invariably distorts long-term decisions.
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Figure 2: Investment without and with government contract: ￿ = 1=2, ￿ = 1=3, ￿ = 2:0(a,
a*);2:2(b, b*);2:4(c, c*).
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